A Proposal for the Abolition of the
Incompetency Plea
Robert A. BurtNorval Morrisl
Though neither convicted of a crime nor civilly committed, many
incompetent criminal defendants have been, in effect, serving life terms
in state mental hospitals.' A study of Massachusetts practice found, for
example, that of all incompetent defendants committed to Bridgewater,
the relevant state institution, "more . . .had left by dying than by all

other avenues combined. ' 2 In Jackson v. Indiana,8 a unanimous Supreme Court ended the common practice of committing for an indeterminate time persons accused of crime but found incompetent to stand
trial. 4 Jackson held that an incompetency commitment cannot last
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1 The number of criminal defendants tangled in the incompetency web is substantial.
In 1967, for example, more than half of all persons who were committed to state mental
institutions when accused or convicted of crimes were committed as incompetent to stand
trial; 38 percent (4,282) of the total were committed for competency determinations and an
additional 14 percent (1,527) were committed as incompetents. By contrast, successful
invocation of the insanity defense accounted for only 4 percent (409) of all criminal
offenders in state mental institutions in 1967. The remaining 44 percent (4,991) were
convicted criminals transferred from prison to mental institutions due to "mental illness."
P. SCHEWEMANDEL & C. KANNO, THE MENTALLY ILL OrENDFR 20 (1969).
2 McGarry, The Fate of Psychotic Offenders Referred for Trial, 127 Am. J. PsYcHIATRY
1181 (1971); see A. MATrsiws, MENTAL DIsABILrrY AND THE CRI INAL LAw 138 (1970).

3 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
4 Jackson invalidates the laws permitting indeterminate incompetency commitments in
almost every state in the country. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15.426 (1959); 17 ARiz. Rzv. STAT.
ANN. § XV-250(B) (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1370-71 (1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1504
(1972); IND. ANN.STAT. § 9-1706a(2) (Supp. 1972) (now codified as IND. CODE of 1971, § 355-8-2(2)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.18 (Supp. 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.020(7) (Supp.
1971); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 95-506(b) (1969); NEv. REv. STAT. § 178.425 (1967); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 122-83 (Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-20-02 (Supp. 1971); Omo Ruv.
CODE ANN. § 2945.38 (1954); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-48-5 (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 957.13 (1958). Most jurisdictions automatically commit all defendants found incompetent
to stand trial; a few states commit only those who are also found "dangerous." See 18
U.S.C. § 4247, interpreted in Maurietta v. Ciccone, 805 F. Supp. 775 (W.D. Mo. 1969); IowA
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longer "than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine
whether there is a substantial probability that [an incompetent criminal
defendant will become competent] . . . in the foreseeable future" and
that "continued commitment must be justified by progress toward
that goal." 5
States will likely be tempted, in the wake of Jackson, to resort to
civil commitment proceedings rather than dismiss charges against and
release permanently incompetent defendants. It is the thesis of this
article, however, that the interests of both permanently incompetent
defendants and the states would be better served by abandonment of
the traditional rule against trying incompetent defendants. Incompetency should instead be grounds for obtaining a trial continuance
during which the state must provide resources to assist the defendant
toward greater trial competence. If trial competence is not achieved
within six months, the state should be required to dismiss charges or
proceed to a trial governed, where necessary, by procedures designed
to compensate for the incompetent defendant's trial disabilities. Proposed rules of court for the granting of trial continuances and the conduct of an incompetent's trial are set forth in the Appendix to this
article.
I.

Jackson v. Indiana

The facts in Jackson starkly presented the plight of incompetent
criminal defendants to the Court. In 1968, when he was twenty-seven,
Theon Jackson was arrested for two purse-snatchings involving $9.00.
(Whether any violence was alleged to have accompanied these robberies
is not clear from the record.) Jackson was a deaf-mute with virtually no
capacity to communicate: he could neither read, write, nor use sign
language. An attorney was appointed for Jackson and, as required by
CODE § 783.3 (Supp. 1972); OrA. STAT. ANN. § 22-1167 (Supp. 1972); S.D. ComPiLr LAWS
ANN. § 23-38-6 (1967).
A few jurisdictions do impose some time limit on incompetency commitments. The
federal commitment statute has been interpreted to require that a defendant who will
clearly never become competent be "transferred [from the federal psychiatric facility at

Springfield, Mo.] to the appropriate state authorities" for civil commitment proceedings.
Cook v. Ciccone, 312 F. Supp. 822, 824 (W.D. Mo. 1970). See also Maurietta v. Ciccone,
supra; Martin v. Settle, 192 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Mo. 1961). New York has recently adopted
a statute imposing maximum time limits on commitments for incompetent felony
defendants and requiring dismissal of any indictment for incompetent misdemeanor
defendants who are civilly committed. N.Y. CODE C~iM. PROC. §§ 730.50(l), (3) (1971);
cf. text at note 43 infra. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-40(d) (Supp. 1972). For
Michigan and Illinois practices imposing limits on incompetency commitments, see note
19 and text and note at note 57 infra, respectively.
5 406 U.S. at 738.
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Indiana law, the trial court selected two psychiatrists to consider his
competency to stand trial. At a subsequent competency hearing, the
psychiatrists filed a joint report concluding that Jackson was mentally
retarded-his diagnosed "moderately severe mental deficiency" was
interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that he had the "mental
level of a pre-school child"O-and that his "almost nonexistent communication skill . . . left him unable to understand the nature of the
charges against him or to participate in his defense." 7 Both psychiatrists
testified that Jackson was unlikely ever to become competent to stand
trial. The state school for the deaf did not accept the "mentally retarded
deaf," and there were no other state facilities that could offer any treatment opportunities to Jackson, even if he had the capacity to benefit
from them. The trial court found Jackson incompetent to stand trial
and, notwithstanding the dreary prospects outlined at the hearing,
committed him to the custody of the state Department of Mental Health
until it could certify that he was competent to stand trial.
The manifest injustice of Jackson's commitment, which the Supreme
Court saw as a life sentence for a permanently incompetent defendant,8
led the Court unanimously to overturn the commitment. The Court
provided two grounds for its decision. First, it ruled that Jackson had
been denied equal protection because the state withheld from him
advantages that it gave to civilly committed persons. Second, the Court
ruled that Jackson had been denied due process because his commitment had no "reasonable relation to the purpose for which" the state
purported to commit him-to make him competent to stand trial.
The Court's equal protection reasoning appears to have been based
on an essential similarity between Jackson's incompetency commitment
and civil commitment: Jackson, like a person civilly committed, had
been involuntarily placed in state custody for an indeterminate period
because he exhibited some mental illness or mental disability. Indeterminate commitment on the basis of mental disability alone has been
increasingly opposed by the Court since its ruling in Baxstrom v.
Herold9 that a convicted criminal cannot be shifted into indeterminate
mental hospitalization at the end of his penal sentence without benefit
6

Id. at 717.

Id. at 718. This formulation is the essential substantive standard for competency to
stand trial in every jurisdiction. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
8 "There is nothing in the record," the Court found, "that even points to any possibility that Jackson's present condition can be remedied at any future time." 406 U.S.
at 726.
9 383 U.S. 107 (1966); see McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972);
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
7
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of the same standards and procedural protections that apply to civil
commitments.
The Court's adherence to the Baxstrom principle has significant
implications, both good and bad, for the rights of mentally disabled
criminal offenders. For the good, the Court is standing firm against
any easy imposition of a hybrid status--"mad and bad"-that states
have used in many contexts to justify longer and more onerous incarcerations for the "criminally insane" than they impose either for criminals
or for the insane. 10 Theon Jackson, for example, could not have been
imprisoned as a criminal since he was never criminally tried. He could
not have been committed for mental illness, since the required demonstrations of illness and consequent need for "treatment" or "detention"
for community or self-protection had not been made. 1 He could not
have been committed as a "feeble-minded person" under Indiana law
without a showing that he was "unable properly to care for [himself]," 2
a possibility discussed below. Yet, notwithstanding the fact that state law
did not authorize criminal or civil commitment, Jackson's unlucky
10 See text and notes at notes 46-49 infra. Among those who suffer from this hybrid
status are criminal defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity, persons committed
under "dangerous sexual psychopath" laws and persons committed under "defective
delinquent" laws. The Supreme Court has ruled that indeterminate extension of a
sex offender's prison sentence based on "mental illness," and indeterminate diagnostic
commitment of a suspected "defective delinquent" violate the Baxstrom principle. See
McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405
U.S. 504 (1972). Lower courts have read Baxstrom to require that ordinary civil commitment proceedings be conducted in order to authorize indeterminate commitment of a
defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity. Bolton v. Harris, 895 F.2d 642 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 224 NX.2d 87 (1966). See also Specht v.
Patterson, 886 U.S. 605 (1967); United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071,
1081 (2d Cir. 1969). For a pre-Baxstrom statement of the problem, see N. Morris,
Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 514, 525 (1968):
The police power and the mental health power are surely sufficient separately
to control questions of dangerousness and the maxima of state power over individual
citizens. It is a mutually corruptive, potent source of injustice loosely and thoughtlessly to blend these two powers, and thus to gloss over in each the proper balance
between state power and the freedom of the individual. Common to both powers
is the concept of social dangerousness. The problem for both prison authorities and
mental health authorities is reasonably and effectively to assess social dangerousness
and to design processes by which these assessments can reasonably be fed into the
releasing procedure. This task is not facilitated by making a porridge, a farrago,
out of the mental health power and the police power and using this mess to avoid
facing this genuinely difficult problem and trying to dispose of it.
11 IND. ANN. STAT. § 22-1201(1) (Supp. 1972) (now codified as IND. CODE of 1971,
§ 16-14-9-1(1)) defines a "mentally ill person" as one who "is afflicted with a psychiatric
disorder which substantially impairs his mental health; and, because of such psychiatric
disorder, requires care, treatment, training or detention in the interest of the welfare
of such person or the welfare of others of the community in which such person resides."
12 IND. ANN. STAT. § 22-1907, 22-1801 (1964) (now codified as IND. CODE of 1971,
§§ 16-15-1-8, 16-15-4-1), construed in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 721 n.3.
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conjunction of mental disability and threshold involvement in the
state's criminal justice system had brought him indeterminate mental
hospitalization.
By following Baxstrom, the Court implicitly asked the right questions: If the criminal charge alone or the mental disability alone would
not have justified Jackson's indeterminate commitment, why should
these factors together have done so? Was Jackson more dangerous than
other accused criminals simply because he was incompetent to stand
trial? Did he need psychiatric care more than the "mentally ill" or
"feeble-minded" simply because he had been accused of a crime? The
Baxstrom principle, as applied in Jackson, forces precise identification
and justification of the purposes served by state mental health commitment laws. It is an invaluable analytic technique with which to
begin disentangling the overlapping, contradictory, and often unacknowledged purposes of the mental health and criminal law powers.
Despite these virtues, the Baxstrom principle also has potential for
harm. If equal protection analysis requires equal treatment for the
"insane" and the "criminally insane," then states may well be drawn
to greater abuse of the mad in order to be sure of ensnaring the bad.
Theon Jackson's situation, further considered, well illustrates this
danger. No one had suggested that he was "mentally ill"; even the
diagnosis of his mental retardation is suspect insofar as it suggested
organic intellectual impairment.1 3 The severity of Jackson's disabilities
is quite plausibly linked to his past history: he is black, born deaf
in rural Mississippi and, until he and his family moved to Indiana when
he was twenty-four, had never attended a school of any kind;' 4 he was
employed at the time of his arrest and had no prior history of institutionalization or arrest.
On this record, as the Supreme Court noted,15 no Indiana law would
appear to authorize Jackson's civil commitment. At the same time,
however, the Indiana law governing commitment of the "feebleminded" does not clearly preclude his commitment. The Supreme
Court construed that law to require a finding that the "feeble-minded"
person was "unable properly to care for himself." This imprecise
formulation, like that found in most civil commitment statutes, leaves
ample opportunity for the state to incarcerate unpleasant people.
13 See P.

HEBER, A MANUAL ON TERMINOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDA-

TION 10-12 (1961).
14 He had recently attended some classes but his progress in attaining communications skills was exceedingly limited. See 406 U.S. at 726; Petition for Certiorari at 21

(app.), Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
15 406 U.S. at 728.
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Jackson is clearly vulnerable., His vulnerability to civil commitment
appears to have been greatly increased by the Supreme Court's ruling
that he can no longer be confined solely because he is incompetent to
stand trial. If state officials cannot bring to trial an incompetent person
whom they believe to be a criminal, and cannot hold him simply because he is incompetent, it is far from unlikely that the civil commitment statute will be stretched to fit his case.
Most civil commitment statutes lend themselves readily to this purpose: substantive standards are vague; fact-finding processes are haphazard; and no effective time limits on commitment are assured., While
reform efforts' 8 have had useful impact in some states, Jackson invites
the states to preserve the worst elements of their civil commitment laws
in order to confine the "criminally insane" who, under the BaxstromJackson principle, can no longer be indefinitely confined as incompetent.10
The Supreme Court indirectly addressed this danger in its discussion
of the due process ground for its holding in Jackson. "At the least,"
the Court said, "due process requires that the nature and duration of
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which
the individual is committed."20 Since Jackson was committed because
he was incompetent to stand trial, the Court concluded that the purpose of such commitment must be to make the defendant competent.2 1
16 Indeed, Jackson's appointed counsel argued that criminal charges should have been
dismissed and Jackson committed as a "feeble-minded person." Brief for Petitioner at
17, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 721 (1972).
17 See generally F. MuLLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix & R. PARNAs, THE MENTAL HEALTH
PRocEss 1507-1627 (1971).
18 See, e.g., California Mental Health Act (Lanterman-Fetris-Short Act), CAL. WELF. &
INsr'NS CoDE §§ 5355 et seq. (West 1972).
19 Consider the "reform" enacted by Michigan in 1966. In response to criticism of
indeterminate incompetency commitments, an eighteen-month maximum was set. MIcH.
CoMP. LAWs § 767.27a(7) (1972). If the criminal defendant has not become competent to
stand trial at the end of this time, civil commitment proceedings are commenced. rd.
If, however, the court refuses to commit the defendant civilly, he is referred to the
criminal court that originally found him incompetent; "If the original committing
court determines that the defendant is still incompetent to stand trial . . . the decision
of the [civil commitment court] is reversed and . . .the defendant [is immediately committed] to the department of mental health for treatment in an appropriate state
hospital." Id. at § 767.27a(8). Jackson invalidates this scheme, but legislatures can be
expected to seek the same result with different formal trappings.
20 406 U.S. at 738.
21 There are, of course, other possible purposes-most notably, to stow away an
awkward, troublesome, and possibly dangerous citizen in order to "protect" the community. See Lewin, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Legal and Ethical Aspects of an Abused
Doctrine, 1969 LAw & SoctAL ORDm 233, 283-84, 284 n.146. The Court properly chose
not to recognize this purpose, and, of course, the state did not directly admit so unat-
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The Court's due process reasoning, applied equally to all civil commitments as its language suggests, would assure that "the nature and duration" of those commitments "bear some reasonable relation to [a
legitimate state] purpose." In effect, the Supreme Court has endorsed
the doctrinal foundation that several lower courts have articulated to
support a constitutional "right to treatment" whenever detention
purports to be based on a need for treatment. 22 Indeed, the Court
explicitly invited litigation to test the relation between the asserted
purposes and actual uses of civil commitments.23 It seems likely, therefore, that the Court is willing to confront directly any misuses of the
civil commitment power that its stringent application of the Baxstrom
principle to incompetents may bring about.
The problems created by misusing civil commitment laws to ensnare
permanently incompetent criminal defendants would not be adequately
resolved by requiring that civil commitment proceedings, like juvenile
court proceedings following Gault,24 closely approximate criminal trials.
That course might better protect incompetent defendants, but if civil
commitment reforms went no further they would not provide adequate
protection to all of the others subject to civil commitment laws. For
this larger group, there can be no adequate protection until civil commitments cease to be indeterminate. This result is the ultimate implication of the Baxstrom-Jackson principle, that any differences between
indeterminate civil commitment of the "dangerous mentally ill" and
criminal confinement of the "dangerous" must be justified. Yet no differences between these statuses can be justified. Our predictive tools
are so uncertain, and the curative promises of long-term confinement
are so hollow, that the "dangerous mentally ill" are indistinguishable
from the "criminally dangerous." Both groups must, therefore, be
treated alike before long-term confinement can be imposed upon
2 5

either.

tractive a motive for committing Jackson, as it would not to justify civil commitments
generally.
22 See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v Stickney, 325 F. Supp.
781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); cf. Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (dictum) (commitment to juvenile home).
23 406 U.S. at 737: "The States have traditionally exercised broad power to commit

persons found to be mentally ill. . . . The bases that have been articdlated include
dangerousness to self, dangerousness to others, and the need for care or treatment or
training. Considering the number of persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the
substantive constitutional limitations on this power have not been more frequently
litigated." (footnotes omitted).
24 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
25 See Morris, supra note 10, at 529-36; Rubin, Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally
Ill Criminals, 27 ARCH. GEN. PSYcHATRY 397 (1972)
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TRiAL OF THE INCOMPETENT

Jackson's invitation to courts to reform civil commitment laws generally should be accepted. Nonetheless, a more direct route to judicial
reform of procedures for dealing with permanently incompetent criminal defendants is needed. The risk that civil commitment procedures
will be misused in order to protect the community against permanently
incompetent criminal defendants would be greatly reduced if the state
were permitted to conduct a criminal trial notwithstanding the defendant's permanent incompetency. The state has a legitimate interest in
confining persons who have committed criminal acts and it will, if
necessary, serve this interest indirectly-and therefore sometimes improperly-through civil commitment proceedings. The defendant has
an equally legitimate interest in contesting his "dangerousness" and
having its factual basis rigorously determined. Although a permanently
incompetent defendant is, by definition, unable fully to enter the
contest, this inability is precisely the same whether the state seeks to
confine him by criminal or by civil proceedings. Of the two, the
criminal trial is more likely to afford the defendant protection against
unwarranted confinement.
There are clear and appropriate differences between the purposes of
civil and criminal commitment. The premise of civil intervention is a
need to prevent infliction of unintended harm to self or others; its
promise is that of effective treatment. It is adequately differentiated
from criminal commitment only by the prophylactic device of a short
time limit, effectively restricting its use to crisis intervention. 26 As the
term of a civil commitment lengthens, however, its claim to a therapeutic purpose loses all plausibility. Community protection becomes
its predominant, if not exclusive, purpose, and civil commitment becomes the functional equivalent of criminal commitment. At that
point, Baxstrom-Jackson demands that civil and criminal commitment
be treated alike-that state confinement of both "ill" and "healthy"
people be accomplished under protections of liberty appropriate to
the criminal law. In particular, some clear community danger must be
proved "beyond a reasonable doubt" to justify long-term confinement
27
of the "ill" as well as the "healthy.Y
Unless the use of indeterminate civil commitments is ended, pro26 Cf. Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. Cm. L. REV.
755, 773 (1969): "The therapeutic problems created by coerced treatment and by the
psychological incapacity of patients to accept, at least initially, an offer of help, suggest
the imposition of a 'duty to be treated' only for a limited period of time."
27 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (criminal confinement for "illness"
as such is cruel and unusual punishment).
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cedural tinkering with commitment laws will have little impact on the
lot of the mentally ill.28 Abandonment of indeterminate civil commitment is, however, unlikely, given its potentially increased utility under
Jackson, unless the states are given adequate means by which to differentiate permanently incompetent criminal defendants from all others
who might be subject to civil commitment laws. While the fact that an
incompetent has been charged with criminal acts does not, of course,
mean that he is guilty, it does indicate that there is probable cause to
believe his guilt.29 States should not, therefore, be denied the power to
sort out those incompetent defendants whose release would endanger
the community. But they should be required to make this determination in a manner essentially equivalent to that in which "dangerousness" determinations are made regarding all accused criminals.3 0
Use of civil commitment laws to identify the "dangerous" among
permanently incompetent defendants would permit states to obscure
the criminal analogue by invoking the specter of mental disability. 3'
28 See generally D. ROTHMAN, THE DIscovERY OF THE ASYLUM

(1971).

29 It may even be that a higher standard of probity is required to support an indictment than the "probable cause" standard required for arrests. See Goldsmith v. United
States, 277 F.2d 335, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1960); F. REMINGTON, D. NEwMAN, E. KIMBALL, M.
MELLI & H. GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL JUSTcE ADMINISTRATION 432 (1969).
30 Long-term confinement of criminal defendants found "not guilty by reason of
insanity" is not inappropriate under the Baxstrom-Jackson principle. Unlike incompetent
defendants and persons civilly committed, these defendants have been tried. But under
current state practice, acquittal by insanity results in indeterminate commitment, regardless of the maximum sentence that might have been imposed for conviction of the
offense charged. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960). While
community protection may justify longer confinement of defendants acquitted by reason
of insanity than of civil commitees, these defendants do not pose a threat demonstrably
greater than do convicted defendants. Baxstrom-Jackson, therefore, requires that confinement of defendants acquitted by reason of insanity be authorized for a period no
longer than the term of imprisonment to which defendants convicted of the same
offense could be subjected.
Several courts have held that under Baxstrom a defendant found not guilty by reason
of insanity may be indeterminately committed only under civil commitment standards
and procedures. See Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); People v. Lally, 19
N.Y.2d 27, 224 N.E.2d 87 (1966). But they fail to apply Baxstrom consistently, since
they effectively authorize unjustified differences in the terms of confinement of convicted
criminals and defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity. At the same time, they
apply Baxstrom too rigidly, insofar as they recognize no differences between the civilly
committed and defendants acquitted by reason of insanity. The courts' requirement that
a separate hearing be conducted, after successful invocation of the insanity defense, to
determine whether the defendant remains "dangerously insane" or should be released at
once may be desirable, however. It preserves at least the appearance of an internal logic
to the insanity defense. For the many anomolies of the insanity defense, see N. Morris,
supra note 10.
31 Cf. Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the 'Insanity Defense'--Why Not? 72 YALE L.J. 853,
868: "[L]argely unconscious feelings of apprehension, awe, and anger toward the
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It would perpetuate the current regime of long-term compulsory confinement for all of the mentally disabled. To safeguard future reform
of civil commitment practice generally, states must, therefore, be permitted to bring permanently incompetent defendants to trial.
Incompetent defendants should sometimes be excused from trial, but
the excuse should only be temporary. That, indeed, is the mandate of
Jackson-trial should be delayed only long enough to permit a disabled
defendant to become more competent. At some point, regardless of the
defendant's success in increasing his competence, the criminal charges
against him should be disposed of, either by trial or by entry of a nolle
prosequi. Incompetency to stand trial would thus be transformed into
one of the recognized circumstances for granting trial continuances,
and nothing more.
Centuries of common law theology stand in the way of this simple
solution. The received doctrine holds that it is unfair and unseemly
to subject a mentally disabled person to a criminal trial.3 2 In Pate v.
Robinson,3 3 the Supreme Court embraced this theology in dicta that
"'the conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent
violates due process," essentially because it is inconsistent with the
"constitutional right to a fair trial." 34
The trial of an incompetent defendant may, indeed, be unfair.
Mental disability may substantially diminish a defendant's capacity
to testify, to recall exonerating circumstances or identify corroborative
witnesses, to aid his attorney before and at the trial, and so forth. In
practice, however, it proves to be even more unfair to most, if not
all, permanently incompetent defendants to withhold criminal trial.
Withholding trial often results in an endless prolongation of the incompetent defendant's accused status, and his virtually automatic civil
commitment. This is a cruelly ironic way by which to ensure that the
permanently incompetent defendant is treated fairly. Yet it is common
practice 5 and, in the wake of Jackson, it promises to become the customary regime for all permanently incompetent defendants.
The state should not ignore the likelihood that trial disabilities may
.sick,' particularly if associated with 'criminality,' are hidden by the more acceptable
conscious desire to protect the 'sick from criminal liability'."
32 See Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899); United States v. Chisholm,
149 F. 284 (S.D. Ala. 1906); Freeman v. People, 4 Denio (N.Y.) 9, 20 (1847).
33 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
34 Id. at 378, 385.
35 See A. MATrHEWs, supra note 2,at 138-40; G. Morris, The Confusion of Confinement
Syndrome: An Analysis of the Confinement of Mentally Ill Criminals and Ex-Criminals
by the Department of Correction of the State of New York, 17 BuxTALo L. Rv.651, 657

(1968).
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afflict a permanently incompetent defendant. An incompetent's trial
could, however, be conducted under procedural rules that in some
measure redress the incapacities suffered by a particular defendant. It
could be required that the prosecution afford complete pretrial dis87
covery of its case;86 that it meet a particularly heavy burden of proof;

that a corroborating eyewitness establish some or all elements of the
alleged offense;8 8 and that special instructions be given to the jury. 9
In any case, requirements governing the availability of postconviction
relief when new evidence is discovered should be less stringent, allowing
relief when the new evidence was unavailable at trial because of the
defendant's incompetence.

40

The Supreme Court lightly hinted in Jackson that the criminal trial
of a permanently incompetent defendant could be permitted: 41 "We do
not read this Court's previous decisions [citing Pate v. Robinson] to
preclude the States from allowing, at a minimum, an incompetent
defendant to raise certain defenses such as insufficiency of the indictment, or make certain pretrial motions, through counsel." 42 A few state
statutes now permit trial of possibly exonerating issues where the inCf. F. REmnGTON et al., supra note 29, at 620-51.
For example, under the present law, a motion for directed acquittal is granted only
if the trial judge "reasonably thinks that a reasonable jury could not find guilt proved
beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 286 (Frank, J., concurring). In the trial of an incompetent, however, it would be appropriate to require
that the trial court grant a motion for directed verdict unless it is itself convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.
8 See text and note at note 72 infra.
39 Cf., e.g., text at note 83 infra. Use of rules such as these, invoked only after the
state has done its best to help a defendant toward greater trial competency, would
satisfy the specific holding of Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), in which the Supreme
Court found that the defendant's rights were violated because the state had "ignor[ed]
the uncontradicted testimony of [his] history of pronounced irrational behavior" and
proceeded to trial without even a hearing on the competency issue, id. at 385-86. Criminal
trial of a permanently incompetent defendant would require disavowal only of the broad
dicta in Pate, not any repudiation of the ethos of that decision. See text at note 34
supra.
40 The general rule for granting a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence
requires that the evidence be "material," that it "will probably produce an acquittal,"
and that "failure to learn of the evidence was not due to the lack of diligence on the part
of the defendant." 2 C. WIGHT, IFDERAL PRACTIc E AND PROCEDURE § 557, at 515 (1969).
For incompetents, retrial could be granted if the newly discovered evidence "might
have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about . . .guilt." Levin v. Katzenbach
363 F.2d 287, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (prosecutor negligently failed to make exculpatory
evidence available to defendant at trial). The due diligence requirement has previously
been relaxed "in favor of indigent defendants with court-appointed counsel." Amsterdam,
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 392 (1964).
41 The Court did not specify any disposition for Theon Jackson, but held, rather, that
his commitment for incompetency to stand trial must be ended. 406 U.S. at 738-39.
42 406 U.S. at 741 (emphasis added).
36
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43
competent defendant's personal participation is not necessary. Some
jurisdictions even permit full-scale trial of the incompetent with the
qualification that a guilty verdict must be set aside and the case retried
after the defendant has become fully competent."
These special procedures for full-scale or more limited "innocentonly" trials are not, however, important reforms. They address the
illogic, tolerated in most states, of precluding an incompetent defendant
from exonerating himself even though he has an irrefutable trial defense. The full-scale innocent-only trial does force the prosecutor to
offer his entire case for judgment. But by their pretense that only an
acquittal is officially recorded, both procedures mask their true import:
the defendant is released if found innocent, but incarcerated indefinitely
if he is not.
For many, perhaps most, incompetent defendants, a clear verdict of
"guilty" would probably be more advantageous than indeterminate
incarceration following a "non-innocent" finding. An excellent empirical study by Louis McGarry and others has established the striking
degree to which this is so in Massachusetts, 45 and it is likely that it is
so in most states. Hospital authorities are exceedingly reluctant to discharge, or even to authorize brief community leaves for, mental patients
confined while criminal charges are outstanding. 46 In many states,
43 See, e.g., MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 95-506(c) (1969); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 730.60(5)
(1971). But see United States v. Barnes, 175 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Cal. 1959).

44 See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 17 (1972); [English] Criminal Procedure
(Insanity) Act 1964, c. 84, § 4; R. v. Roberts, [1953] 2 All E. R. 340 (Devlin, J.). The
expense and possible duplication of effort involved in this procedure has led at least
one progressive bar association committee to recommend against adoption of "innocentonly" trials of incompetent defendants. MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT: A SECOND REPORT AND ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE SPECIAL COMtMITEE ON THE STUDY OF COMMITMENT PROCEDURES AND THE LAW RELATING TO INCOMPETENTS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY oF NEw YORK 115 n.104 (1968)

[hereinafter cited as SPECIAL COMMITEE STUDY].
45 McGarry studied two reasonably comparable groups of criminal defendants found
incompetent to stand trial; persons in one group had been civilly committed following
dismissal of charges and persons in the other had been committed until competent to
stand trial on the criminal charges, which remained outstanding. McGarry found, over
a seven-year observation period, that the average confinement of those committed as
incompetents was sixty-one months while the average hospital stay of those who were
civilly committed was only fourteen months. One in six of the incompetent defendants
had been returned to the community, but every member of the civilly committed
group had been discharged to the community. McGarry & Bendt, Criminal vs. Civil
Commitment of Psychotic Offenders: A Seven-Year Follow-up, 125 Amr. J. PSYCHIATRY

1387 (1969).
46 See Memorandum from William H, Anderson, M.D., Director, Department of
Mental Health, State of Michigan, to Superintendents of Hospitals for Mentally III, March
14, 1969, at 1-2 (copy on file at The University of Chicago Law Review) (emphasis added):
[N]o patient hospitalized with the legal status of incompetent to stand trial shall
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their release is specifically forbidden 47 and, in practice, hospital authorities must take the initiative of negotiating with prosecuting officials to dismiss charges. 48 Even where release is not formally proscribed, the practical obstacles are formidable; only a zealous state
hospital administrator will have much success in freeing a patient
confined with criminal charges outstanding. 49
Though Jackson no longer permits indefinite incompetency commitments, the Court has not ruled on whether a state can maintain outstanding criminal charges following civil commitment of an incompetent defendant.50 It thus remains possible that the more onerous
treatment now accorded incompetents committed with charges out51
standing will continue when their commitment is denominated civil.
If, however, the state were given the option to try a permanently
be released on visit, leave of absence or convalescent status, and all indicated
reasonable precautions shall be taken to prevent such patients from leaving the
hospital without authorization. Patients in this legal classification are not eligible
for discharge under any circumstances.
In view of the history of criminal involvement in these cases and the continuing
jurisdiction of a criminal court, the avoidance of an unauthorized absence or escape
is to be given priority consideration.
47 See, e.g., ArA. CODE tit. 15, § 426 (1959): "In no event shall such person be set at
large so long as such prosecution is pending ...."
48 Local prosecutors are frequently reluctant to dismiss charges, no matter how long
the incompetent accused has been confined in the state institution. See A. MATrmws,
supra note 2, at 138-40. In a recent habeas corpus proceeding the prosecutor refused
to dismiss charges, or to speculate about whether the trial of an eighty-six-year-old
defendant, who had been confined as incompetent for almost twenty years, could ever
take place. Though key witnesses for the prosecution and defense had died, the state
argued that "the question whether the prosecution has evidence on which to go to
trial.'" United States ex rel. von Wolfersdorf v. Johnston, 317 F. Supp. 66, 67 (S.D.N.Y.
trial . . . ought to be considered 'only e * when and if the relator is able to stand
1970).
49 A study of inmates in Mattewan, the relevant institution in New York, found that
in 1965, 19 percent (208) of those confined as incompetent to stand trial had been there
for twenty years or more, and 8 percent (89) had lieen there for thirty years or more.
In 1966, the Supreme Court decided Baxstrom, which involved a Mattewan inmate, and
under the impetus of that decision, the number of twenty-year men was reduced to
sixty-nine, and the number of thirty-year men to twenty-six. SPECiAL ComrrE STUDY,
supra note 44, at 214-17 (tables 8 & 9). Based upon their independent examinations, Dr.
McGarry and his colleagues found that 33 percent (71) of the men indeterminately
committed to Bridgewater as incompetent to stand trial could be immediately returned
for criminal trial. The average hospitalization of those who could be returned for trial
had lasted four years and three months, while the average hospitalization of those still
incompetent to stand trial had lasted fourteen years and nine months. McGarry coneluded that the statistics "more than suggest that most of the total population of 219
had been competent for trial early in their hospitalization and that a return for trial
at that time would likely have spared them decades of hopeless and regressive institutionalization." McGarry, supra note 2, at 1183.
50 406 U.S. at 739-40.
51 See Morris, supra note 10, at 524-25; text and note at note 45 supra.
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incompetent criminal defendant, there would be no justification for
invoking civil commitment processes without dismissing the criminal
indictment.
Giving the incompetent defendant-rather than the state-the power
to choose between criminal trial and civil commitment proceedings
would be much less desirable for both the defendant and the state.
An incompetent defendant is, at least as much as an ordinary defendant,
at the mercy of his attorney's skill and zeal. Like the typical criminal
defendant, the typical incompetent relies upon appointed counsel or
some form of public defender representation. 52 Both groups of attorneys
are often heavily burdened with work and less than fully skilled in or
fully committed to criminal advocacy, particularly when complicated
by issues of mental illness. 53 A criminal trial takes time and effort;
incompetency commitment and civil commitment proceedings are less
time-consuming and easier for all the official participants. The extravagant number of accused misdemeanants who are committed, on their attorney's motions, for incompetency determinations requiring thirty- to
ninety-day confinements 4 is testimony to the casualness with which
defendants may be channeled toward commitment and away from trial.
In practice, it appears that a permanently incompetent defendant's best
interest would almost always be served by permitting the state to proceed to criminal trial.15
In addition, the state's legitimate interest in community protection
may on occasion require that an incompetent defendant who would
otherwise opt for civil commitment proceedings be brought to trial.
Indeed, the state's need to resort to criminal trial would be greatest
precisely when civil commitment processes are reformed to become
sufficiently rigorous in both substantive formulation and administration. A recent Illinois decision and its sequelae in a case "virtually indistinguishable"5 6 from Jackson, illustrate this need. An illiterate deaf52

See generally Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).

53 See Lewin, supra note 21, at 246: "In most [Michigan incompetency-determination]

Mhis assistance could best
cases, the defendant did have the assistance of counsel ....
be described as inept, inadequate, and a travesty of the traditional system of advocacy."
CONFERENCE OF THE DIsrcr OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, REPORT OF TH
CONNECTED WITH MENTAL EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED IN
CRI INAL CAsES, BEFORE TRLAL 49 (1965): "[I]n the seven-year period fiscal 1956 through
54 Cf. JUDICIAL

COMMrTrEE

ON

PROBLEMS

fiscal 1962, Saint Elizabeth's Hospital received as incompetent more than twice as many
accused misdemeanants (422) as accused felons (194)."
55 There would be some incongruity in a rule that vested the choice between trial
and civil commitment proceedings in the incompetent defendant, even if his counsel
could be relied upon to choose wisely for him. Cf. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384
(1966) ("[Ilt is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet
knowingly or intelligently 'waive' his right[s] .... ').
56 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 735 (1972).
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mute, indicted for murder, had been committed in 1966 as incompetent to stand trial. As the Jackson Court recounted:
The institution where petitioner was confined had determined,
"... that [petitioner] will never acquire the necessary communication skills needed to participate and cooperate in his trial." Petitioner, however, was found to be functioning at a "nearly normal level of performance in areas other than communication."
The State contended petitioner should not be released until his
competency was restored. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed.
It held:
"This court is of the opinion that this defendant, handicapped
as he is and facing an indefinite commitment because of the pending indictment against him, should be given an opportunity to
obtain a trial to determine whether or not he is guilty as charged
or should be released." [People ex rel. Meyers v. Briggs, 46 Ill. 2d
281, 288, 263 N.E.2d 109, 113 (1970)].r7
Quite possibly the Court was unaware that the Illinois defendant
was not in fact brought to trial; in the four years that had passed since
his indictment, the state's case had virtually vanished. Because the defendant was "functioning at a nearly normal level . . . " civil commitment proceedings were not instituted either, and the defendant was
released. A few months later, he was arrested for the murder of a
young woman, accomplished in precisely the same manner and in
similar circumstances as had been alleged in the indictment of four
years earlier. This time the state proceeded immediately to criminal
58
trial and the defendant was convicted.
As the Illinois case shows not all incompetent criminal defendants
are proper candidates for civil commitment. The state's legitimate interest in public safety requires that some incompetent defendants be
tried notwithstanding their trial disadvantage. Of all the trial disadvantages under which a defendant may labor, however, present rules
make mental disability the only one that permanently disables the
state from bringing the defendant to trial no matter how energetically
it has tried to remedy his disadvantage. A long delay between the discovery of an offense and its prosecution, or between arrest or indictment and trial may, of course, create a trial disadvantage that bars
trial because of limitations statutes or the constitutional guarantee of
a speedy trial.5 9 But since state authorities are dearly responsible, by
Id. at 735-36.
58 People v. Lang, No. 71-2564 (Cook County, IlL. Crim. Ct., 1971).
59 See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Note, The Right to a Speedy
Trial, 20 STAN. L. REv. 476, 485 (1968).
57
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willful acts or omissions, 60 for the delay that causes the defendant's disadvantage, it roughly accords with justice to bar vindication of the
state's interest in community protection.
The conflicting interests of the state and mentally incompetent defendants cannot, however, be reconciled by Solomonic devices: the
community's need to identify a harmful actor and protect itself against
him is not diminished in urgency or in justice by the fact that he is
mentally disabled. Similar interests are reconciled in the several contexts examined below by a device at least as familiar as a statute of
limitations.
An accused who is at a trial disadvantage not attributable to unjustified state action may be granted a continuance in order to minimize the obstacle to a fair trial. In these situations, analogous to that
created by mental disability, criminal trials are not permanently precluded. Rather, they are properly delayed. When it becomes clear that
the trial disadvantage cannot be remedied, criminal trial does take
place. There is considerable tension, therefore, between the notion
that due process forbids criminal trial of mentally disabled persons
and the equal protection principle implicit in the Baxstrom-Jackson
inquiry into why the mental disability of some accused or convicted
offenders should lead to their being treated differently from others
similarly situated.
1. Unavailability of Witnesses. The Sixth Amendment gives a criminal defendant the right "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." Although the absence of a favorable witness can
completely undermine an accused's defense, inability to produce a missing witness does not bar trial. Even further, a defendant is not necessarily granted a trial continuance during which to locate a witness. The
customary rule has been stated more narrowly:
When a continuance is sought to obtain witnesses, the accused
must show who they are, what their testimony will be, that the
testimony will be competent and relevant, that the witnesses can
probably be obtained if the continuance is granted, and that due
diligence has been used to obtain their attendance on the day set
for trial.61
There are two notable differences between the "missing witness"
60 See United States v. Ewell, 38 U.S. 116 (1966); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 361
(1957) (wrongful trial delay must be caused by a "deliberate act of the government,"
which was both "purposeful" and "oppressive").
61 Leino v. United States, 338 F.2d 154, 156 (10th Cir. 1964). See also C. WRiGrr, supra

note 40, § 832, at 338.
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disadvantage and the mental disability disadvantage. First, although
both involve constitutional guarantees, the trial prejudice caused by
absence of a witness must be shown with much more particularity to
warrant a short continuance than current "incompetency" practice demands to justify indefinite incarceration. Second, although reasonable
efforts to remedy the missing witness disadvantage must be permitted,
at some point the government's interest in conducting a criminal trial
does take precedence.
2. Defendant's Memory Loss by Amnesia. A defendant's diminished
capacity to stand trial because he has amnesia of the events surrounding the alleged crime works the same disability regardless of whether
the amnesia is linked to a diagnosed mental illness. 62 Nevertheless, the
incompetency to stand trial doctrine takes account only of amnesia
linked to mental illness. This theological rigidity seems required since,
if all amnesiacs are found incompetent, then all criminal defendants
who, for example, "can't remember where they were on the night of
the crime" must also be found incompetent. If, however, permanent
memory loss, from whatever cause, were not a permanent bar to trial,
courts would no longer need to distinguish among indistinguishable
trial disabilities.
The District of Columbia Circuit has recently recognized the anomaly worked by the different treatment of "mentally ill" and other amnesiacs. In Wilson v. United States,63 the defendant suffered serious
head injuries in an automobile accident following a police chase from
the site of a bank robbery. The court ruled that the defendant's consequent amnesia of the events of that day was relevant to his competency to stand trial, although not caused by "mental illness."'64 From
this premise, Judge Fahy reasoned along traditional lines that the defendant could never be criminally tried since his amnesia, and therefore his incompetency, was permanent. 65 The court majority disagreed,
holding that "the probability of prejudice, not lack of memory per se,
[is] controlling" on the question whether trial can be held. 66 Because
of the defendant's amnesia, the court imposed special procedural rules
on any trial-most notably, that the government's case must satisfy an
62 See Regina v. Podola, [1959] 3 All E. R. 418 (amnesia from concussion suffered in
attempted escape from scene of crime charged); Note, Amnesia: A Case Study in the
Limits of Particularjustice, 71 YALE L.J. 109, 116 (1961).
63 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
64 Id. at 463.
65 Id. at 466 (dissenting opinion).
66 Id. at 464 n.4.
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extraordinary burden of proof and that the trial court must make
whatever other adjustments are necessary to redress the defendant's
67
disadvantages at trial.
3. Defendant's Memory Loss by Extensive Time Passage.Passage of
time between the date of a crime and trial can drastically reduce an
accused's capacity to defend himself, not only because his memory fades
but also because witnesses' memories cloud or witnesses become unavailable altogether. Our law has traditionally protected defendants
against this trial incapacity in two ways-by statutes of limitations and
by the constitutional right to a speedy trial.6 8 As we have noted, these
time limits are imposed only as a result of certain government conduct; justifiable government delays, though equally disabling to criminal defendants, do not bar trial.69
A recent series of innovative decisions" by the District of Columbia
Circuit offers a close analogy to the changes in incompetency doctrine
suggested here. In these cases, the government purposefully delayed
the arrest of parties to alleged narcotics sales, and then justified this
delay on the ground that its undercover agents must remain anonymous
for long periods of time to retain their usefulness, publicly divulging
their incriminating information for purposes of a criminal arrest or
indictment only at the conclusion of their undercover service. The defendants could hardly be held responsible for these delays.
The court permitted trial of these defendants in some circumstances,
notwithstanding the government-created delays. In so holding, the
court did not rely solely on the artificial notion that the speedy trial
guarantee looks only to the time between arrest or indictment and
trial 7 1 It recognized that the delay between the alleged offense and
the date of arrest could work fundamental unfairness to a defendant,
but required the defendant to make a particularized showing of prejudice in the context of the specific charges and the defendant's spe67 Id. at 463-64. The Wilson court went further than here proposed, see text at notes
36-55; it directed the trial court, should the defendant be convicted, to determine
whether the defendant's disadvantages were sufficiently overcome and, if not, to set
aside the verdict and dismiss the indictment. Id.
68 See authorities cited note 59 supra.
69 See cases cited note 60 supra.
"t0 See, e.g., Woody v. United States, 370 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Worthy v. United
States, 352 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1965), vacated on other grounds, 384 U.S. 894 (1966);
Cannady v. United States, 351 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d
210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
71 See, e.g., Worthy v. United States, 352 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1965), vacated on other
grounds, 384 U.S. 894 (1966).
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cific needs. The strength of the government's case, and particularly
whether the complaining witness's testimony was independently cor2
roborated, was considered a central determinant of the trial's fairness7
4. Defendant's Disruptive Behavior at Trial. One traditional rationale for the incompetency doctrine has been that the trial of a
mentally disabled person should not proceed because, though physically present, he is "not there" rationally for purposes of exercising his
rights of confrontation and allocution.73 The unseemliness of trying an
obviously disabled defendant,7 4 whether because he is unattractive or
disruptive at trial, is a related explanation. Both of these arguments
have been met, however, by the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Illinois v. Allen"5 that, notwithstanding the constitutionally guaranteed
right of confrontation, an unruly defendant can be tried while physically restrained or even while absent from the courtroom.
Current events have led the press, and perhaps the Court itself, to
view Allen solely as a response to politically-motivated courtroom disruptions. The facts, however, relate the ruling more directly to our
immediate subject, the propriety of trying mentally disabled criminal
defendants. As Justice Brennan brought out in his concurring opinion,
the record suggested that the defendant "was a sick person . . .who
may or may not have been insane in the classical sense but who apparently had a diseased mind."76 Allen had been found incompetent
to stand trial immediately following his indictment on the charges for
which he was ultimately convicted. A year later he was found competent and trial followed, accompanied by the courtroom disruptions
for which the Supreme Court approved his binding and gagging. Allen can be read, therefore, as approving special rules to conduct the
trial of a plausibly incompetent defendant.77 It need hardly be said
that a bound and gagged, not to mention absent, defendant is signifi72 See Morrison v. United States, 865 F.2d 521, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1965); 2Bey v. United
States, 350 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 905 (1966); Ross v. United
States, 349 F.2d 210, 215-16 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
73 See Illinois v. Allen, 897 U.S. 337, 338 (1970); Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
74 Cf. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 22 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Mhe
heritage of the common law . . . deemed it too barbarous to execute a man while

insane.").
897 U.S. 337 (1970).
76 Id. at 356-57 (Brennan, J., concurring).
77 One court has suggested that a defendant's disruptive behavior at trial may, in
itself, require judicial inquiry into his competency to stand trial. See Pouncey v. United
States, 349 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
75
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cantly disabled in making his defense. The analogy to otherwise disabled-because incompetent--defendants is close. 78
As these examples suggest, a criminal defendant's interest in having
the highest possible degree of "trial competency" need not permanently bar trial. Indeed, in the case of amnesia unrelated to mental
illness, it does not bar trial even though the defendant's disadvantage
is precisely the same as it would be if mental illness were its cause.
Where the disadvantage is attributable to mental incompetency,
courts should be no more hesitant to authorize the use of tranquilizing
medications than they must be under Allen to authorize physical restraint. Some jurisdictions have nonetheless applied the rigid rule that
use of any tranquilizing drugs by a criminal defendant is itself conclusive evidence of trial incompetency. Since the Cook County, Illinois,
Criminal Court embarked on this policy in 1970, the result has been
that incompetent defendants are committed to state mental hospitals
where medications are administered to reduce the defendants' anxieties so that they can face trial. The defendants are then returned
to jail, and, by court rule, psychotropic medication is withdrawn at
least seventy-two hours before trial.79 Under the pressures of jail and
impending trial, without medication, many of these defendants are
taken to court highly disturbed, hence unfit for trial,8 0 and therefore
recommitted to the state mental hospital, completing the first circle of
an absurd merry-go-round.81
Use of drugs could, of course, interfere with a defendant's compe78 Courts are not averse to trying defendants who are physically disabled. For example,
in Redwine v. State, 36 Ala. App. 560, 61 So. 2d 715 (1952), the defendant's arms and
legs were fractured at the time of trial; he could hardly gesture very vigorously in his
own defense. In Shetsky v. State, 290 P.2d 149 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955), the defendant was
tried while on a stretcher, attended by a physician, nurse, and ambulance driver; he
may not have regarded himself as entirely present at trial. See also United States v.
Knohl, 379 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1967).
79 See Notice from Dr. Patrick R. Staunton, Chicago Area Zone Director, Illinois
Department of Mental Health, to All Superintendants, Chicago Area Zone, July 8, 1970
(copy on file at The University of Chicago Law Review), relating instructions from Chief
Justice Joseph Powers of the Criminal Court of Cook County.
80 See, e.g., People v. Farris, Indictment No. 60-1061 (Competency Hearing, Cook
County, Ill. Cir. Ct., June 9, 1971).
81 The Illinois Counsel on the Diagnosis and Evaluation of Criminal Defendants'
recommendation that the more appropriate rule-that use of tranquilizing or other drugs
does not necessarily render a defendant unfit for trial even though such drugs are essential
to "insure and maintain his mental fitness"---was not accepted by the legislature. Compare
Ill. Unified Code of Corrections § 510-6(f) (Tent. Draft 1971) with Mll.Unified Code of
Corrections § 1005-2-1 (1972). See also Hansford v. United States, 365 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Hayes v. United States, 305 F.2d 540 (8th Cir. 1962); State v. Rand, 49 Ohio Op. 2d
127, 247 N.E.2d 342 (Com. P1. 1969); State v. Arndt, 1 Ore. App. 608, 465 P.2d 486 (1970).
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tency to stand trial, if, for example, the drug's effect were to give him
an odd appearance8 2 that might lead a jury to misinterpret his courtroom demeanor: an unperturbed "wooden face" might give a jury the
impression that the defendant is a calculating, merciless criminal.8 3
That is not to say, however, that even a defendant drugged into openeyed somnolence should never be brought to trial. Rather, efforts
should be made in all cases to avoid trial of a drugged defendant, and
trial should go forward with the aid of medication only if it is necessary for the defendant's improved competency. If medication seriously
interferes with his trial conduct or appearance, but the defendant is
permanently incompetent without such drugs, the trial should be permitted under special rules to mitigate the deleterious aspect of the
drug's use. For example, the jury should be given a cautionary instruction at the beginning of trial explaining that the defendant's odd
appearance and his nonparticipation at trial is a product of the tranquilizing drugs.
III.

CONTINUANCES AND

INCOMPETENCY:

A

RECOMMENDATION

Our discussion thus far has concerned procedures appropriate for
dealing with permanently incompetent criminal defendants. Whether
a particular incompetent defendant is permanently incompetent was
given central importance by Jackson: only a defendant whose incompetency is not permanent may be committed for treatment solely because he is incompetent to stand trial. How, then, are courts to
determine the permanence of a defendant's incompetency?
We propose two general rules to govern this determination. First,
before trial is ever delayed solely on the ground of a defendant's incompetency, a court must specifically find that there is a "substantial
probability" that the defendant will be competent to stand trial "within
the foreseeable future." Second, no trial may be delayed longer than
six months solely because of a defendant's incompetency.
The first of these rules derives directly from the Court's holding in
Jackson that preliminary diagnostic commitment of an incompetent
defendant "cannot be... for more than the reasonable period of time
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that
he will attain [trial competency] in the foreseeable future."8 4 The
Court thus clearly implied that subsequent commitment, following an
82

370

See generally F.

REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, THE TnEoRY AND PRACTICGE OF PSYCHIATRY

(1966); L. GOODNIAN & A. GILMAN, THE PHAPUIACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS

(3d ed. 1965).
83 See State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960).
84 406 U.S. at 738.
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initial diagnosis, must be grounded on "substantial probability" that
the defendant will become competent "within the foreseeable future"
-that is, "soon."8' 5 On this basis, Theon Jackson's incompetency commitment was wrong from the beginning. As the Court noted, nothing
in the record of his initial commitment proceeding suggested "any
possibility that Jackson's ... condition can be remedied at any future
time."6
Under the Jackson Court's demand of a "substantial probability of
success," incompetency commitments can probably be justified in practice only if state authorities provide courts with individual treatment
plans that specifically set out the particular defendant's treatment
needs, the capabilities of state facilities to meet those needs, and the
prior experiences with comparably disabled persons upon which the
state bases its favorable prognosis for the individual defendant.8 7 Requiring some specific justification for the state's prediction that its
treatment will help the defendant may appear to be tilting at windmills,8 8 in view of the present, limited capacity to make predictive
85 "Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant probably soon will be
able to stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that
goal." Id. (emphasis added).
86 Id. at 726.
87 To vindicate patients' constitutional rights to treatment, the following requirement
was recently imposed upon Alabama state mental institutions:
Each patient shall have an individualized treatment plan ... developed... no later
than five days after the patient's admission. Each individualized treatment plan shall
contain:
a. a statement of the nature of the specific problems and specific needs of the
patient;
b. a statement of the least restrictive treatment conditions necessary to achieve the
purposes of commitment;
c. a description of intermediate and long-range treatment goals, with a projected
timetable for their attainment;
d. a statement and rationale for the plan of treatment for achieving these intermediate and long-range goals;
e. a specfication of staff responsibility and a description of proposed staff involvement with the patient in order to attain these treatment goals;
f. criteria for release to less restrictive treatment conditions, and criteria for discharge;
g. a notation of any therapeutic tasks and labor to be performed by the patient ....
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 384 (M.D. Ala. 1972). An earlier stage of this litigation
is reported at 325 F. Supp. 781 (1971).
88 The low state of prediction and treatment skills in psychiatry is no reason for courts
to withhold pressures for their improvement. Cf. Bazelon, New Gods for Old: "Efficient"
Courts in a Democratic Society, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 653, 657 (1971):
If, in response to constant judicial questioning, the official answer is always, '"We
don't know why we're doing what we're doing," something substantial has been
learned. Equally important, there is then simply no reason why courts should accept
these official solutions as true and act upon that basis. It is one thing to take
judicial action upon the basis of expert knowledge beyond judicial ken. It is quite
another to take judicial action on the basis of an expert's conclusion when he
himself admits that he doesn't know what he's talking about. But unless the
courts ask the necessary question, they can never be sure which situation is which.
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judgments in mental health matters generally. A less demanding showing, however, is unlikely to establish "substantial probability" and
likely to degenerate into an empty litany of promises that cannot be
kept.
The Supreme Court's directions on the permissible duration of initial diagnostic commitments and any subsequent incompetency commitments are, unfortunately, not explicit. Diagnostic commitment may
be for no more than a "reasonable" time, but reasonable in relation
to what? The time needed for a diagnosis is largely a function of the
state's willingness to commit resources to that purpose. With a sufficient number of psychiatrists and psychologists, diagnosis could usually be performed in a few days and always in the defendant's home
community. The courts are not likely to insist on attainment of this
ideal, but it would be regrettable if they allowed Jackson's "reasonableness" standard to validate existing practice. Most states presently
permit thirty- to ninety-day diagnostic commitments,8 9 often to remotely located state institutions far from the family and community
ties that might enable the accused to sustain such equanimity as he
can in adversity. The Court should have made clear that constitutional
norms demand expedition in diagnosing trial competency, treating
those incompetents whose disability is not permanent, and terminating
their incompetency commitments. Two constitutional rights are, after
all, at stake-the rights to bail and to speedy trial.
In many states, a determination of incompetency makes a defendant
automatically ineligible for bail release,9 0 although the Supreme Court
long ago held that restrictive bail must be justified, at a court hearing,
as "relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant"' '
at trial. Denying bail to an incompetent may be justified if his confinement for treatment is clearly necessary to make him competent and
thus to "assur[e his] presence at trial." At the same time, however, denial of bail to the many defendants who may be helped toward competency as well, or better, in outpatient facilities,9 2 or for any time
longer than is relevant to "the purpose of assuring [their] presence" at
trial, violates the constitutional norm. 93
89 See A. MArHEiws, supra note 2, at 81-82. For the procedures typically followed in
the psychiatric evaluation, see JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE Disruc'r OF CoLUrmBIA CIRCUIT,
supra note 54 at 29-31 (1966).
90 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15.426 (1959); ARIz. CRIM. P.R. 250(B); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1371; IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1706a (Supp. 1972) (now codified as IND. CODE of 1971,
§ 35-5-3-2); NEv. REV. STAT. § 178.430 (1971).
91 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
92 See generally, Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Practical Guides and ConstitutionalImperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107 (1972).
93 Apart from considerations derived directly from the constitutional right to bail,
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In most states, the right to a speedy trial has been considered inapplicable to defendants committed as incompetent, thus permitting indefinite pendency of criminal charges and trial following release from
commitment.M A few courts have attempted to justify this procedure
by arguing that an incompetent defendant "waives" his right to speedy
trial when he is committed. 95 Even though the defendant himself might
be incompetent "knowingly and intelligently" to waive the right,9 6 the
argument might be plausible-or at least tolerable-if the incompetency commitment benefits the defendant. But the defendant reaps
only detriment from any commitment other than a short-term commitment likely to make him more competent for trial. It might also
be argued in defense of present practices that the right to speedy trial,
abridged only by "purposeful" state delay, 97 is not abridged where delay is necessitated by a defendant's incompetence. Once an incompetency commitment ceases to have "substantial probability" of making
the defendant competent, however, it is quite apparent that continued
commitment serves only the state's purpose of keeping the defendant
off the streets. Neither theory, therefore, disguises the fact that an incompetency commitment that becomes no more than bare incarceration
should not toll the guarantee of a speedy trial.
Consideration of an incompetent defendant's constitutional rights to
bail and a speedy trial leads to the conclusion, announced in Jackson,
that incompetency commitment can be justified only by a high probability that it will lead to trial "soon." The question still remains, "How
soon is soon?" Since the duration of commitment is itself the determisome courts have held that the state is constitutionally obliged to provide the least

restrictive setting possible for any involuntary treatment, whether accomplished by civil
or incompetent criminal defendant commitment procedures. See Covington v. Harris,
419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v.

Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Chambers, supra note 92, at 1145; cf.
United States v. Klein, 325 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1963).
94 See, e.g., ARiz. Cium. P.R. § 250(B); IN]. ANN. STAT. § 9-1706a (Supp. 1972) (now
codified as IND. CODE of 1971, § 35-5-3-2) ("[U]pon the return to court of any defendant
so committed he or she shall then be placed upon trial for the criminal offense the same
as if no delay or postponement has occurred by reason of defendant's insanity.'); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 552.020 (Supp. 1971); Omno REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.38 (Page 1954); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 26-4-5 (1968); UTAH ANN. CODE § 77-48-5 (Supp. 1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-241(C)
(Supp. 1971). But see In re Harmon, 425 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1970); Williams v. United
States, 250 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1957); United States ex reL. von Wolfersdorf v. Johnston,
317 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Jackson, 306 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
95 See, e.g., State v. Violett, 79 S.D. 292, 111 N.W.2d 598 (1961); Note, supra note 59, at
480; cf. Commonwealth v. Bruno, 435 Pa. 200, 255 A.2d 519, 522 (1969).
96 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966); see note 55 supra. The speedy trial
right is properly deemed to be waived when delay results from defendant's self-interested
conduct. See, e.g., Osborne v. United States, 371 F.2d 913, 925-26 (6th Cir. 1967) (repeated
motions); United States ex rel. Von Cseh v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1963).
97 See cases cited note 60 supra.
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nant of whether constitutional rights are violated, it is apparent that
"soon" should not be very long at all.
The Jackson Court refused "to prescribe arbitrary time limits" for
incompetency commitments "[i]n light of differing state facilities and
procedures and a lack of evidence in [the] record. 98s But there is no
way to resolve the question of permissible duration other than to impose "arbitrary time limits." The time needed to remedy a defendant's
incompetency to stand trial is, to a significant degree, dependent upon
the state's willingness to commit treatment resources to that end. While
the time required for treatment is not as subject to control as the time
needed for diagnosis, it is nonetheless clear that allocative choices in
favor of psychiatric treatment resources do have important impact on the
length, and even ultimate success, of treatment in a substantial number of
cases. 9° Thus, the Jackson Court's conclusion that time limits for incompetency commitments should not be imposed without greater
knowledge of "differing state facilities and procedures" runs backward.
Time limits should be imposed in order to dictate the facilities and
procedures that the state must make available.
The time limits required need be arbitrary only in the sense that
the values at stake are not reconcilable by quantification. A defendant's
disadvantages from pretrial delay and incarceration, against which
rights of speedy trial and bail would normally protect, can be legion.
Conversely, a multitude of disadvantages can arise from the trial of a
mentally incompetent defendant. Who can say with certainty when the
disadvantages addressed by the speedy trial right-for example, the fact
that witnesses may vanish--outweigh the disabilities worked at trial by
the defendant's mental incapacities-for example, the fact that his own
memory of crucial events is inaccessible?
The Supreme Court has elsewhere accommodated individual constitutional rights to the state's interest in community protection by using arbitrary time scales. The Court has held, for example, that the
constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to offenses punishable
by less than six months' imprisonment.1 00 It has permitted criminal
contempt proceedings to be conducted without traditional constitu.
tional safeguards so long as imprisonment does not exceed six
months.10 ' With regard to voting rights, the Court has recently ruled,
in effect, that the Constitution prohibits a durational residency require98 406 U.S. at 738.
99 See, e.g., L. ULLMANN, INSTITUTION AND OUTCOME: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS (1967).

100 See Baldwin v. New York, 599 U.S. 66 (1970).
101 Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
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ment of more than thirty days; 102 the particular constitutional right
at stake led the Court to mandate a greater than customary allocation
of state resources to vindicate the state's legitimate interest in the integrity of election processes. The same kind of mandate should be applied to incompetency commitments.
We urge that the maximum permissible commitment of those found
incompetent to stand trial be set at six months. That is a markedly
shorter time than that allowed in the few jurisdictions that now effectively limit incompetency commitments. New York's recently enacted maximum commitment for incompetent felony defendants is
two-thirds of the maximum sentence that would be permitted following
conviction of the offense charged' 03-- making law of the premise that
permanently incompetent defendants are to be treated as though guilty
of the offense charged. Federal practice, which permits incompetency
commitments of approximately eighteen months before a defendant
must be released from federal custody and the indictment against him
dismissed,10 4 reflects the related assumption that any person confined
for eighteen months will almost certainly have his confinement continued under state civil commitment laws. 10 5 These extensive time
limits on their face violate the constitutional rights to bail and speedy
trial: "[C]ontinued commitment must be justified by progress toward
[the] goal" of trial competency. 106 Since the constitutionality of an incompetency commitment now depends upon a persuasive showing of
a favorable prognosis, years-long confinement is patently absurd.
Confinement for one year's time might have treatment justification
in some cases. But, if the central argument of this article is accepted,
termination of an incompetency commitment will not necessarily lead
to dismissal of the criminal indictment, as it does under current federal and New York practice. If criminal trial is possible following termination of an incompetency commitment, then one year's confinement
seems too long. It would be wrong to add a year's delay to the other
disadvantages that a permanently incompetent defendant might face
102 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
(1971). Incompetent misdemeanor defendants
are committed for ninety days "for care and treatment in an appropriate institution;"
the court "must dismiss the indictment ... " Id. at § 730.50(1).
104 See Drendel v. United States, 403 F.2d 55, 56 (5th Cir. 1968); Cook v. Ciccone, 312
F. Supp. 822, 824 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
105 A committee of the District of Columbia Judicial Conference, for example, recommended a two-year maximum for incompetency commitments essentially on the ground
that indefinite hospitalization will most likely follow any two year's incompetency commitment. JUDIciAL CONRENCE OF THE DisrRiar OF COLUMBIA CIRcurr, supra note 54,
at 133, 138-39.
106 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 US. 715, 738 (1972).
103 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 730.50(3)

The University of Chicago Law Review

[40:66

at any criminal trial. Six months is a long period of confinementlong enough, in our judgment, for the state to offer help to an incompetent defendant and long enough for the defendant to learn whether
the help offered will do him more good than moving immediately to
trial on the criminal charges against him.
Our proposal has two further advantages to recommend it. First, it
will help make the initial determination of competency to stand trial
more sensible. The present substantive standard for competency is
elusive. The Supreme Court has said:
[I]t is not enough for the district judge to find that "the defendant
[is] oriented to time and place and [has] some recollection of
events," but.., the "test must be whether he has sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational1 07as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.
In practice, it is difficult to draw satisfactory distinctions among the
varieties of psychological impairments that can reduce a defendant's
ability to consult with his attorney or to understand and participate in
his trial. The law has purported to avoid this problem by seeking only
reasonable degrees of difference among impairments.108 Psychiatrists in
court have sought to avoid the problem by restricting incompetency
opinions to labelled "psychoses,"' 0 9 contrary to court-proclaimed doctrine. Under our proposal the court's ultimate inquiry would be
whether any disadvantageous psychological disability exists and
whether short-term treatment likely to remedy that disability is available. Distinctions drawn among psychological disabilities in order to
justify trial continuance on grounds of incompetency would, therefore,
be drawn along functional lines. They would almost necessarily be
more rational.
Second, if the consequences of an incompetency finding were simply
to delay criminal trial long enough to attempt to make the defendant
competent, courts might be more willing to provide treatment opportunities to any defendant whose emotional stability and consequent
trial competency could be improved. Similarly, criminal defendants
would be able to request treatment without fear of being swept into
indeterminate commitment. 110 Paradoxically, permitting the state to
107 Dusky v. United States, 562 U.S. 402 (1960).
108 See, e.g., Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HAav. L. REv. 454, 459 (1967).
109 The essence of the typical colloquy between judge and psychiatrist runs: "Doctor,
is he competent?" "Your Honor, he is psychotic." And they pass in the night. See A.
MATTHEWS, supra note 2, at 85-87.
1to See Evans v. Kropp, 254 F. Supp. 218, 222 (E.D. Mich. 1966), which held that an
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try permanently incompetent defendants seems likely to secure to more
criminal defendants the due process right to be free from serious psychological impairment at trial.
APPENDIX
PROPOSED RULES OF COURT GOVERNING TIAL CONTINUANCES FOR
MENTAL DIsABILITY

(1) A motion for trial continuance may be filed by the defendant
or by the prosecuting attorney alleging that the defendant's competency to stand trial is impaired by mental disability; that is, that the
defendant lacks sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and/or that he
lacks sufficient understanding of the proceedings against him.
(2) Upon the filing of such a motion, or upon the court's independent determination that there is a question regarding the defendant's
competency to stand trial, the court shall conduct a hearing. If, at the
hearing, the court determines that there is sufficient reason to believe
that further examination of the defendant by licensed psychiatrists is
necessary to determine the defendant's trial competency and his prognosis for greater competency, the court may adjourn the hearing for
this purpose for a period of no more than three weeks.
(3) The court shall determine, at the hearing if adjournment is unnecessary, or at a subsequent hearing no more than three weeks after
the initial hearing if adjournment was necessary, (a) whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial because of mental disability and,
if so, (b) whether there is substantial probability that the defendant
will become competent to stand trial within six months. If the court
finds that psychotherapy is required to remedy the defendant's disability, the court shall determine whether an adequate individual plan for
the defendant's treatment has been prepared. An adequate plan will
specify the program and facilities available for treatment of the defendant and the prior treatment experiences with comparably disabled
persons upon which is based the claim of a substantial probability that the defendant will become competent to stand trial within six
months.
attorney's "failure to inform the court of his client's mental condition [suggesting incompetency] deprived [the defendant] of the effective assistance of counsel .... " The attorney

had explained that "in his judgment, his client would be far better off in a state prison
from which he would be eligible for parole in ten years than he would in the state
hospital for the criminally insane ....

[The hospital's facilities] were so inadequate...

that commitment would result in permanent confinement in that institution."
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(4) If the court makes affirmative determinations under sections (3)
(a) and (3)(b), the court shall grant a trial continuance of no more than
three months. If the defendant requires psychotherapy to remedy his
disability but is unable to afford such treatment from his own resources, the court shall order that the state provide psychotherapy services to the defendant on an out-patient basis unless it is clearly
necessary that treatment be provided on an in-patient basis to make
him competent. If in-patient treatment is clearly necessary, the court
may order the defendant confined for psychotherapy in an appropriate
state facility.
(5) No more than three months following the grant of the trial continuance authorized by section (4), the court shall conduct a hearing
to determine (a) whether the defendant remains incompetent to stand
trial because of mental disability and, if so, (b) whether, on the basis
of the defendant's progress toward remedying his disability, there is a
substantial probability that the defendant will become competent to
stand trial within three months. If the court makes affirmative determinations under subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court may
grant a further trial continuance for no more than three months. The
court may order, or continue its previous order, that the defendant be
confined for psychotherapy in an appropriate state facility as provided
in section (4).
(6) A motion for trial continuance shall not be granted solely because tranquilizing drugs or other medications have been or are being
administered to the defendant under medical direction, unless the
court finds that there is substantial probability that the defendant will
not require the drugs or medication to be competent for trial within
the appropriate time limit prescribed by section (3) or (5).
(7) If, under the procedures set out in sections (3) or (5), the court
determines that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial because of
mental disability but that there is no substantial probability that such
incompetency will be remedied within the appropriate time limit, or
that such incompetency has not been remedied within the time- prescribed by section (5), the court shall grant no trial continuance on the
ground of the defendant's incompetency. If the prosecuting attorney
indicates an intention to bring the defendant to trial, the court shall
determine at a pretrial hearing whether fundamental fairness to the
defendant requires that special trial or pretrial procedures be used in
order to redress his disabilities. The court may prescribe any or all of
the special pretrial and trial procedures set out below, or such other
procedures as it deems necessary:
(a) Prior to trial, the court shall review all the evidence that the
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prosecution intends to offer at trial and shall order pretrial disclosure
of evidence that would materially assist the defendant in overcoming
the disabilities under which he labors. Disclosure of evidence that may
endanger the lives of witnesses, or in any way promote substantial injustice, shall not be ordered;
(b) On motion for directed verdict, either before or after jury
deliberation, the court shall demand from the prosecution a higher
burden of proof than would obtain in an ordinary criminal prosecution, and the court shall insist on extensive corroboration of the prosecution's case with respect to issues on which the defendant is likely to
be prevented by his disability from effective rebuttal;
(c) If the trial is before a jury, the court shall instruct the jury
that in weighing the evidence against the defendant, it should take into
account, in the defendant's favor, the disabilities under which he went
to trial. If trial is before the judge sitting alone, he shall take account
of those disabilities.
(8) Any conviction shall be set aside if evidence that was not available for trial because of the defendant's incompetence subsequently
becomes available and might have led at trial to a reasonable doubt regarding the defendant's guilt.

